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SCOTUS AND THE KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE SINGULAR REVISITED 
James B. South 
Tn his Ordinatio John Duns Scotus writes: 
I say that in the intellective part there is memory and re 
membering, properly so called. For presuppose that the 
intellect not only knows universals (which is true indeed of 
its abstractive intellection that the Philosopher speaks of, 
for that alone is scientific), but also that it can know intu 
itively what the sense knows (for the more perfect and 
higher cognitive power in the same subject knows what the 
inferior power knows) and that it can also know of sensa 
tions. (Both assumptions are proved from the fact that the 
intellect knows contingently true propositions and draws 
inferences from them, for to form propositions and to 
syllogize is proper to the intellect.)1 
This passage is typical of the way in which John Duns Scotus 
distinguishes abstractive cognition from intuitive cognition in 
the case of the intellect. I take this to be the basic text for 
Scotus's account of intuitive cognition and throughout this pa 
per I shall call it the "Ordinatio text." We see here that one of 
the prime functions of intuitive cognition is to warrant the claims 
we make about contingent statements. Now, many contingent 
statements refer to singular items in the world. Such proposi 
tions as "Trixie is a cat" and "I am writing this sentence" are 
clearly making existential claims. However, in addition to their 
existential aspects, there is a further feature of propositions of 
this type that we must worry about, namely, the extent of the 
knowledge we have concerning the objects referred to by the 
singular terms in the propositions. That question leads to a fa 
mous problem in medieval accounts of intellectual cognition 
insofar as Aristotle repeatedly asserted that the intellect knows 
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universals while the sense knows particulars.2 The fact of con 
tingent propositions with singular terms referring to singular 
objects seems to sit uneasily with the division of labor that ap 
parently underlies Aristotle's distinction between the objects of 
intellect and sense. How does the intellect come to a knowledge 
of the singular? However one answers this question, the issues 
of the existential warrant of contingent propositions and the ac 
cess to knowledge about singulars need to be kept separate. 
One interesting feature of the Ordinatio text is that it sug 
gests that through intuitive cognition the intellect can know 
whatever the senses know. This claim raises several important 
issues. First, and most obviously, sensory cognition and intellec 
tual cognition are quite different in that the latter operates 
without any organ while the former is organic. Moreover, if the 
objects of sensory experience are available to intuitive cogni 
tion, it would seem to make the existence of sensory powers 
redundant. Why bother with sensation if the intellect can just 
take a look around by itself? At the same time, worries arise 
about the scope of our knowledge of singulars. It would seem 
that we know more than the senses alone can provide. After all, 
we reason about singulars and that extends beyond the sensory 
powers of the lower animals. 
Our ability to reason about and classify singulars raises the 
further issue of what we know about those singulars. What is it 
that we know when we assert that "Trixie is a cat" that encom 
passes more than Trixie's membership in the species "cat"? There 
are at least two very different possibilities here. One, we might 
know something about Trixie that differentiates her from every 
other singular in the world. In Scotus's terms, as we shall see, 
this would amount to knowing the "thisness" or haecceitas of 
Trixie. Second, though, we might just know Trixie as some aggre 
gate of qualities that are not specific to her. On this possibility, 
we would not have any knowledge that could differentiate Trixie 
from any other cat possessing identical universal qualities. 
In this paper, I want to present the outline of Scotus's account 
of our cognition of singulars showing that Scotus denies that we 
have any access to the thisness of singulars. However, that is 
not my sole project. In addition I want to show that Scotus's 
theory of intuitive cognition of singulars might best be under 
stood by seeing how it relates to a persistent problem in 
contemporary philosophy concerning the status of propositions 
that make reference to singular material objects.3 I am aware 
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that the issue of intuitive cognition plays a rather peripheral 
role in Scotus's thought, although the Ordinatio passage, itself 
rather late, suggests that Scotus saw that his account of cogni 
tion required intuitive cognition to do rather a lot of important 
work.41 shall first present the philosophical problem that I want 
to use in order to frame Scotus's discussion, then I shall turn to 
a consideration of Scotus's own view before returning to the way 
in which Scotus might present a solution to the problem of the 
reference of singular propositions. 
The Problem of Singular Propositions 
In order to better understand the way that Scotus provides a 
striking and original way to think about this issue, I want to 
sketch out a context for his solution by examining an influential 
recent discussion of the problem. Thus, while it may appear that 
I am abandoning Scotus in what follows, it is only because I need 
to set out recent discussions in some detail. When I return to 
Scotus's own view below, we will be in a position to see the dis 
tinctive answer that he furnishes. 
When I say, for example, that "The cat is gray" or, when point 
ing at a painting, say "That is beautiful," what is going on? On 
the simplest level, we seem to be predicating a general quality 
("gray," "beauty") of a singular item ("the cat," "that painting"). 
Such propositions differ from those that predicate a general term 
of another general term ("Cats are mammals"). On further analy 
sis, though, questions can be asked about the singular items as 
well. How does "the cat" pick out a unique referent? Is the foun 
dation for "the cat" some unique property of an item that no 
other item shares or is it merely a reference to some collection 
of qualities gathered together? If the latter is all that we mean 
by "the cat," then there is nothing intrinsically unique to the 
referent; the same qualities could conceivably occur in some other 
item. More precisely, the question at hand is whether we differ 
entiate between propositions that are purely qualitative and 
those that seem to have a peculiar reference to a particular ob 
ject. Of course, on one influential view we should not make such 
a distinction. According to a standard reading of Frege, for ex 
ample, to say "The cat is gray" is to refer to a contingent, purely 
qualitative property (gray). Moreover, on this view, proper names, 
indexicals, and demonstratives are themselves merely shorthand 
terms for the qualitative, non-particular constituents of the item 
to which the term "the cat" refers.5 However, this qualitative 
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view of propositions has been the subject of dispute in recent 
philosophical discussions. While the criticism of the qualitative 
view comes in many forms, I shall present it in what I take to be 
its most intuitively plausible and non-technical form. 
In his important paper "The Problem of the Essential Indexi 
cal," John Perry presents the following example: 
I once followed a trail of sugar on the supermarket floor, 
pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter 
and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with 
the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each 
trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I 
seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was 
the shopper I was trying to catch. 
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack 
was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn't believe 
that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I 
came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped 
following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the 
torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain 
my change in behavior.6 
What is happening in this example? Perry takes it that his expe 
rience shows that individual propositions, those involving proper 
names, indexicals, and demonstratives, are different from purely 
qualitative propositions in that the former are constituted by an 
individual element and cannot be reduced to some qualitative 
description to explain their content. It will not do to substitute 
a series of accidental qualities in place of the indexical "I" in his 
example because no matter how extensive the description given 
is, it will not have the same content as the proposition contain 
ing the indexical. We can see the point most clearly if we 
recognize that what mobilizes the shopper to change his behav 
ior is not the complex description, but his realization that he is 
making the mess. Although I will not argue for it here, I think 
that Perry is right to argue from this example to the conclusion 
that there is something special about individual propositions in 
that they are not all reducible to qualitative propositions. Much 
more needs to be said about the content of such propositions. 
For our purposes, though, it is sufficient to note that one of the 
primary issues is how we can know such content. It is not at all 
obvious that we observe such particularized properties. After 
all, what we can sense about the shopper seems in no way pecu 
liar. Another way of stating this problem is to note that all the 
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conditions in the shopping story could be replicated by positing 
some identical twin or doppelganger with identical sensible in 
trinsic and extrinsic qualities. Yet each would, presumably, 
recognize the awareness that he was the shopper to be unique. 
So, the question at hand involves specifying what can ground 
that kind of cognitive awareness. 
David Austin7 has constructed an example to demonstrate one 
of the theory's most severe problems. We are to imagine a test 
subject hooked up to a device consisting of a large opaque screen 
and two eyeholes. The eyeholes in turn are attached to separate 
tubes that each point to a large red piece of plastic that is of 
uniform color and equally illuminated at all points. Because the 
two tubes can be moved independently, the test subject does not 
know if the tubes are directed at the same object. So, through 
her right eye she sees a patch of red and through her left eye 
she sees a patch of red. She names the patch that she sees with 
her right eye "this" and the patch she sees with her left eye 
"that." Given that her eyes are focusing independently, she has 
two independent visual fields. Austin argues that the test sub 
ject will believe the following claims: 
1) This is red and that is red. 
2) This = this and that = that 
However, she will not be so precipitous as to claim that: 
3) This = that 
At the same time, though, if we think about the content of these 
propositions, we run into difficulties. After all, the red patches 
are identical qua red patches. If we graphically represent the 
propositions that the test subject can consider, they would look 
as follows: 
a) This = this: < = > 
b) That = that: < = > 
c) This = that: < = > 
Thus, despite a plausible epistemic caution on the part of the 
test subject, it appears that she should believe, based on the 
content of the first two propositions that "This is that" and yet 
she knows perfectly well that she should not believe that "This 
is that." Here, obviously, is where things get complicated. Do we 
reject the intuitions that led us to posit individual propositions 
in light of the consequence that positing such propositions will 
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sometimes lead us astray? Is there some way to fix the theory of 
individual propositions? What we would need is some way to hold 
onto the idea that there is some unique content that precisely 
differentiates two otherwise qualitatively similar experiences. 
Austin makes one suggestion for saving individual proposi 
tions that I want to consider. He points out that we typically 
think of belief as a two-term relation constituted by a thinking 
subject and a proposition. However, what if belief is not a two 
term relation? Austin considers the possibility that belief might 
be analyzed best as a three-term relation. What would the three 
terms be? Well, obviously we need a believer and a proposition. 
Since we are not sure what would constitute such a third term, 
we can leave a precise characterization of the third term to the 
side for the moment, invoking instead a place-holder or vari 
able. So, we have the test subject, her propositions that can all 
be graphically represented as "< = >" and some third term, 
call it "x." Such a third term opens up the possibility of our 
rejecting the conjunction of statements that would require some 
one to believe: 1) that "This is this" 2) "That is that" and 3) 
"This is that." In other words, whatever "x" is, it would identify 
uniquely the singular proposition over and above the content of 
the proposition by itself. Again, for the theory to have any bite, 
that is, in order to avoid twin or doppelganger fixes, such a 
unique identifier ought to be grounded in some intrinsic prop 
erty. Schematically, then, we could substitute instances of the 
variable "x" that are intrinsically distinct from each other and 
will destroy the apparent symmetry that generates the unwanted 
consequences of the two-term formula. Thus, there is no rea 
son for someone to believe that < = > + r and < = > + s 
requires her to believe that < = > + t. Despite the prospect 
of a solution to our problem that such a triadic analysis of belief 
brings forth, Austin remains skeptical because he sees no fit 
ting candidate for our variable "x."8 Now, what I want to suggest 
is that Scotus provides us with a suitable candidate for the 
variable "x" in his theory of intuitive cognition of singulars. I 
turn to a sketch of his account of the knowledge of the singular 
in order to isolate the peculiar knowledge of the singular that 
we have through intuitive cognition. 
Scotus on Knowledge of the Singular 
I shall begin the discussion of Scotus on the knowledge of the 
singular with a brief detour through the metaphysics of the 
singular. Scotus, as is well known, argues that there must be a 
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principle that combines with the other realities present in sin 
gular objects by which those objects are singular. There are 
present, then, within any individual, various realities all of which 
are common. The common nature of a cat, for example, includes 
the common natures of animal, mammal, animate being, etc. Just 
as the nature "cat" is a more positive determination of the na 
ture "animal," so too the individual difference is the positive 
determination of the nature "cat." By such differentiation, we 
arrive at that which can no longer be multiplied or instantiated 
elsewhere. The one cat in front of me is this cat and no other. 
This principle of individuation or positive determination is the 
"thisness" or heacceitas at the core of the individual and the 
hallmark of thisness is incommunicability.9 In principle, of course, 
this positive determination is intelligible. For example, Scotus 
tells us: 
The singular includes the whole essential entity of [spe 
cific nature] above it, and in addition it has that ultimate 
grade of actuality and unity; and ... this added unity does 
not diminish but adds to the entity and the unity, and thus 
to the intelligibility. Also, the singular includes nothing that 
is not included in the universal except the aforesaid grade. 
But intelligibility is not excluded from it by reason of some 
thing included in the universal, because then the universal 
would not be intelligible per se; neither [is intelligibility 
excluded] by reason of the added grade of entity, because 
then God or a singular angel would not be intelligible per 
se; therefore, etc.10 
There can be no doubt that the singular as such is intelligible as a 
positive determination of what is more common. Consequently, 
the thisness, or haecceity, provides some intrinsic determination 
that would differentiate two otherwise identical objects. Given 
the postulation of such an intrinsic determination, we also need 
an account of how this determining principle can become known. 
So while the metaphysical issue is straightforward, the issue about 
the way in which we know the singular must be considered. The 
striking fact that we shall see in the course of the paper is that 
Scotus in fact denies that there is any direct knowledge of the 
singularity of objects available to us. In spite of the intrinsic in 
telligibility of singulars, that intelligibility is inaccessible to us. 
Why? An adequate answer to this question will involve coming to 
grips with the general features of Scotus's account of cognition. 
As a preliminary context for the discussion to follow, let me 
state up front that rather surprisingly intuitive cognition will 
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not be coming to our aid in understanding the haecceity of ob 
jects. In other words, whatever role intuitive cognition plays in 
Scotus's thought, it will not help us to know the individual na 
tures of sensible, singular realities. In fact, Scotus denies that 
we can have any cognition of material singulars as they are sin 
gular, or as he puts it, we have no per se knowledge regarding 
the singular. Of course, we have knowledge about singulars in 
other respects, for example, their presence and existence, but we 
cannot know the singular as singular. Moreover, Scotus argues 
that this restriction applies to the cognitive powers of both the 
senses and the intellect. The former is rather surprising, since 
we tend to think that the operations of sense are directed at 
discreet sensible qualities. I sense that white, after all, not just 
any white at all. 
Before looking at his argument in some detail, a caveat is in 
order. This discussion pertains to the knowledge of singulars 
that we can have in this life; that is, it is due to the fact that all 
intellectual knowledge has its origin in sensation.11 It turns out 
that in the present life, the dependence on the sense powers, a 
dependence that can be explained either because of original sin 
or because of the natural harmony (concordia) of the powers of 
the soul, places severe restrictions on our ability to know mate 
rial singulars.12 There are two points mixed up in this contention. 
First, all intellectual cognition relies on imagination. As such, 
all intellectual cognition relies on phantasms that have no nec 
essary connection with the existence and presence of the 
sensible object. Second, the fact that sensation itself does not 
get at the singular as singular suggests that the intellect's de 
pendence on sensory experience is what keeps it from knowing 
the singular as singular. It is instructive to see how Scotus ar 
rives at these restrictions. 
A few preliminary distinctions are in order. Scotus distin 
guishes between two types of cognitional processes, namely, 
sensation and intellection. Sensation, in turn, can be divided into 
external sensation and internal sensation. External sensation 
concerns the sensible qualities existing in the singular object 
such as its color, odor, texture, and the like, while internal sen 
sation concerns the sense perceptible whole, the phantasm. The 
crucial difference resides in the fact that external sensation is 
dependent on the presence of the object sensed. I cannot sense 
a cat unless a cat is present to my senses. Scotus states that the 
external sense is of the simul totum. This grasp of the whole at 
one moment thus includes both the perceptible qualities and 
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their existence.13 While, the internal senses, or more generally 
the imagination, can imagine sensible objects when they are not 
present, that is, they can abstract from existence, this abstrac 
tion from existence should not be confused with some sort of 
universality proper to the intellect. The phantasm represents 
the singular and its entire representative power is so invested.14 
Scotus's worry here is to point out that the phantasm is not 
sufficient of itself to represent the universal; the precise man 
ner in which sensation represents the singular remains unclear. 
Just as there are two types of sensation, so too there are two 
types of intellectual cognition (intellectio). The first, which he 
calls "quidditative" (quiditativa), is that operation by which we 
consider those natures that are intelligible apart from their ac 
tual existence. This type of cognition can have as its object both 
what is universal and what is singular. In other words, there can 
be a knowledge of singulars that is not about their existence just 
as we can consider universals that do not as such exist. This 
kind of intellectual cognition is dependent on the phantasm and 
the phantasm, as we saw, itself carries no warrant for existence 
claims. The other type of cognition Scotus calls "vision" (visio). 
Vision, or more commonly intuitive cognition, concerns the ex 
isting object as existing. We must be careful here. We shall have 
to canvas both types of cognition in order to determine what 
sort of knowledge each provides concerning the singular. Here 
is how Scotus states the distinction between the two types of 
intellectual cognition: 
There is a double intellection; one quidditative which ab 
stracts from existence; the other, which is called "vision," 
is of the existent as existent. The first, although it is gen 
erally of the universal, it can be primarily of the singular. 
And whenever it is of the singular, it is of it primarily. For 
the singular of itself is not determined to existence, be 
cause it abstracts from it just as the universal does. The 
second intellection is of both together, i.e. of the singular 
insofar as it is existing. And in this way?explaining 'simul 
totum' [the whole at once] as Aristotle understands it?it 
does not include some accident but only existence, which 
does not pertain to the individual's formula, neither inso 
far as it is a quiddity, nor insofar as this singular participates 
in this quiddity.15 
This passage shows Scotus underscoring the limited nature of 
intuitive cognition by pointing out that the existence reached in 
intuitive cognition is not part of the nature (ratio) of the object. 
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Because existence is neither a "quid" nor something participat 
ing in a "quid," he denies that the singular itself is an object of 
intuitive cognition in any primary way (primo modo). For an 
object to be an object primo modo it must be adequate to the 
cognitive activity and that takes place in the realm of quiddi 
ties, not by considering existence. It would be hard for Scotus to 
be more explicit: the singular nature, or thisness, of a material 
object is inaccessible to intuitive cognition and this contention 
is perfectly consistent with the Ordinatio passage that connects 
intuitive cognition with the underwriting of contingent existen 
tial propositions. An objection might be raised here concerning 
sensation to the effect that surely sensation is in contact with 
singular qualities intrinsic in singular items. It must, conse 
quently, have some awareness of, or contact with, the thisness 
or haecceity of the sensible object. Nonetheless, Scotus explic 
itly denies that the senses can sense haecceity.16 Consequently, 
if we are to have knowledge of the individual nature, or thisness, 
of a material singular it will be through some abstractive cogni 
tional process: all that intuitive cognition can warrant is a claim 
about existence. 
While it looks, then, as if our most promising candidate for a 
knowledge of the singular will be found in abstractive cognition, 
it is important to remember the restrictions placed on abstrac 
tive cognition. Although the singular is intelligible per se in 
abstractive knowledge, it is not so intelligible to our cognitive 
powers in our present state. As a result, Scotus countenances 
no immediate, that is non-inferential, knowledge of either a ma 
terial substance, such as this cat, or of the singularity of the 
substance, its haecceitas. All that he will allow is an increasingly 
distinct conceptual grasp of a material singular by a concept that 
grasps an exhaustive number of accidents of a substance. Scotus 
argues that anything that we know per se we know under some 
particular aspect (ratio) that can be used as a principle of iden 
tification in the absence of other differentiation. Much the same 
reasoning applies to the case of sensation. Vision, for example, 
knows color per se; whatever other differences there may be, 
any visible object can be identified as colored. However, sensa 
tion does not grasp a color's singularity. While this claim seems 
odd initially insofar as the gray I see in one cat and the gray I 
see in another cat are clearly different, Scotus is making a very 
subtle and plausible point. After all, there is nothing about any 
particular color I sense that makes that color as sensed inca 
pable of being multiply instantiated, yet that criteria is crucial 
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for the notion of individual difference or thisness. Consequently, 
I do not ever sense a color that is singular in the relevant mean 
ing of the term. 
The most distinct knowledge we can have of a material object 
is available, then, when we can identify it most precisely. How 
ever, the most precise identifications available to us are not such 
as to get at the singularity of objects. This fact applies to both 
sensation and intellection as is clear from the following passage: 
The most distinct intellection of the singular seems to be of 
some intention [concept] which the intellect knows distinctly; 
but positing such precisely, and prescinding from [all] time 
differences and the various degrees of intensity as well as 
all other accidents ["befalling"] such an intention, it does 
not seem that our intellect knows how to distinguish or dif 
ferentiate this intention from the intention of any other singular 
of the same species that may be shown to it. . . . This whiteness 
may be put in the same place with that whiteness, and this re 
mains this and that remains that, because this is not this by 
the fact that it is in this place. Does the sense discern that in 
the same place there are two whitenesses, if they are equally 
intense? It does not.17 
It is clear from this thought experiment that neither the intel 
lect nor the sense can penetrate into the singularity of realities; 
both must stop at a level of commonality that allows for multiple 
instantiations of the thing known or sensed. By extending the 
denial of distinct cognition of singularity to the senses, Scotus 
in effect places singularity out of our reach, at least in this life. 
Other considerations are brought to bear by Scotus on our 
lack of knowledge of the substances of material objects. He ar 
gues that whatever affects a cognitive power immediately does 
so by its presence. Now, just as we can recognize darkness as 
the absence of light, we should be able to recognize the absence 
of substance when it is not present. This, of course, we cannot 
do. The point that Scotus is trying to make here is that if we 
wanted to claim that we could know a substance per se, we would 
have to posit a type of cognition that we do not in fact have. It is 
clear from experience, Scotus believes, that all of the knowledge 
we have of a substance arises from its accidents. His example of 
such an experience is the consecrated host. By all knowledge 
that we are able to have we are unable to discern the fact that 
the substance of bread is no longer present. There is no cogni 
tive mechanism for discerning the absence of a substance when 
all of its accidents remain the same.18 
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Given that we have no direct, immediate, and per se, knowl 
edge of either material substances or their singularity, what kind 
of knowledge of material singulars do we have? Scotus holds that 
our actual knowledge of material singulars arises by reflection 
(reflexio) on the phantasm.19 Scotus's explication of the notion 
of "reflexio'" involves a progressive unfolding of specificity from 
the immediately given universals that are the first objects of 
the human intellect in its present state. The phantasm plays a 
major role in this process insofar as Scotus believes that there 
is "in" the phantasm a "confused something" (confusum). This 
phantasm potentially contains within itself either the substance 
with its accidents or simply many accidents somehow mutually 
related. When the intellect first understands, the agent intel 
lect illuminates the phantasm and produces an intelligible species 
that is then known by the potential intellect. This intelligible 
species represents the universal, that is, the nature of the mate 
rial singular as it is knowable.20 In knowing the singular, the 
intellect abstracts each of the accidents present in the phan 
tasm so that the nature is known with its proper accidents. To 
this knowledge, the intellect adds the notion of a subject with 
accidents and in this way comes to some sort of distinct knowl 
edge of the material singular. This kind of knowledge is the most 
distinct knowledge of material singulars that we can have in this 
life. It is striking that this knowledge is nothing more than a 
concept of a cluster of accidents joined to the notion of a sub 
stance. Thus the singular is known by applying several universal 
aspects together into one concept. If we knew the singular in its 
real specificity we would know it in such a way that it would not 
be contradictory for the description to apply to any other object. 
Thus the knowledge that we have of the singular is always, para 
doxically, a universal knowledge.21 
It should be clear that all of this knowledge falls under the 
category of abstractive knowledge, that is, knowledge that is in 
different to existence. Scotus explicitly states that no real 
concept is caused in the intellect in this life except by those 
things that naturally move the intellect, and what moves the 
intellect is the combined activity of the phantasm and the agent 
intellect. They are, in fact, one integrated cause in the process 
of knowledge, producing one effect, namely, the intelligible spe 
cies. Scotus explains the way in which phantasm and agent 
intellect are related by comparing it to the relation of mother 
and father in the production of a child. Both the mother and fa 
ther play essential, but unequal roles in producing offspring. The 
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activity of the father is superior to that of the mother, he thinks, 
but the central point is that the mother does not receive her 
proper power in the process from the father, nor is the mother's 
power somehow latent in the father. Rather, neither separately 
is capable of producing a child. In the same way, the agent intel 
lect does not give to the phantasm the latter's causal power. The 
phantasm is, in itself, intelligible and does not receive that in 
telligibility from the agent intellect. Moreover, the phantasm 
does not have any real effect on the intellect insofar as it exists 
in the extended sensitive power. So, Scotus concludes, they each 
have their own causal power and are related as superior cause 
(agent intellect) to inferior cause (phantasm) in the production 
of one effect (the intelligible species).22 
The phantasm, as a product of the imagination, is indiffer 
ent to existence. Accordingly, it would seem that all intellectual 
knowledge of the nature of the singular is both abstractive and 
universal in the sense that what we know about singulars is their 
communicable properties. Now, since our Ordinatio text explic 
itly says we can know and reason about contingent statements, 
there must at least be some intellectual access to the existence 
of the object in order to warrant such existential claims. We saw 
above that that was the role that intuitive cognition played. While 
intuitive cognition, both sensory and intellective, has no access 
to thisness, it does have access to existence. While, then, our 
sensory and conceptual knowledge of Trixie may be abstractive 
and consist of a progressive conjunction of universal attributes, 
the existential knowledge that we have that "Trixie is on the mat" 
must be the result of some non-abstractive intellectual process. 
As we saw, Scotus juxtaposes the intellect's intuitive cogni 
tion with the cognition of external sensation. Both are of the 
simul totum. The five external senses reach the existence of sen 
sible objects because there is a direct causal link between the 
external sensible object and the sensory representation of one 
of these sense powers. By contrast, abstractive sense knowledge, 
as we have seen, is the result of the activity of the imagination. 
Here the direct causal link is severed. The imagination is able to 
form phantasms that have no direct causal connection with ex 
ternal objects, whether because the external object is not 
currently present, or because the external object does not exist. 
Intellectual cognition must be modeled on these two types of 
sensory cognition: just as there is abstractive cognition in the 
intellect, so too there is intuitive cognition in the intellect. 
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Every thing that is part of the perfection of knowledge can 
pertain to intellectual knowledge with greater right than 
sense knowledge. Now the possibility of grasping the ob 
ject in its reality is a part of perfection, whenever this would 
not be prejudicial to the power of attaining the object be 
cause of its imperfection. Therefore, the intellect can have 
an act whereby the object is grasped in its real existence, 
at least that object which is more noble or on a par with 
the intellect. And if one concedes that our intellect can 
grasp some existing object in this way, then with equal rea 
son we could admit it is possible for any object, since our 
intellect has the capacity for receiving the knowledge of 
anything intelligible.23 
The major question involves the precise understanding of this 
intuitive intellectual knowledge. That we have such knowledge is 
expressly stated by Scotus. As our Ordinatio text shows, it is 
the ground for knowing true contingent propositions. The truth 
of such contingent propositions follows from the intuitive cogni 
tion of their objects, that is, the knowledge of their existence. 
At this point a caution is in order. It might be thought that 
Scotus is proposing a rather straightforward view to the effect 
that whenever the senses are aware of some object, the intellect 
has a direct awareness of the same object. In fact, this was the 
way Scotus was read both by many later Scotists as well as by 
later thinkers in general. However, this is a misleading reading 
of Scotus's actual position.24 Scotus is trying to explain how we 
can know existence when all of our intellectual knowledge appar 
ently arises from intelligible species that are abstracted from 
the phantasm by the agent intellect. His answer is not that the 
intellect intuitively knows the existing object, but rather that 
the intellect is intuitively aware of the fact that the senses are 
perceiving an object. This claim may seem needlessly complex, or 
worse, may even seem to interfere with the directness of intui 
tive cognition. In fact, his most explicit account of the mechanism 
of such cognition occurs within the context of a discussion of in 
tellectual memory. He explains that while the object initially known 
is not present in memory, there must be something present in 
the memory to account for the ability to remember past events 
and objects. What is present is a species, a species that was im 
pressed by the intellect's awareness of the act of sensation, and is 
the result of intuitive cognition, not any activity of the agent in 
tellect. This species is the proximate object of memory.25 In other 
words, Scotus argues that the intellect can possess memory only 
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if the intellect has the ability to know intuitively the acts of the 
sensory power. It is important to stress that the intellect creates 
a species of the past sensory experience. The sense powers do not 
impress such a species on the intellect and consequently the in 
tellect is directly aware of the activity of the senses. Moreover, it 
is the sensory act of which the intellect is aware, not some prod 
uct of the experience. Thus, the intellect's intuitive cognition 
bypasses, as it were, the phantasm: a happy feature of the ac 
count given the abstractive nature of the phantasm. Scotus, then, 
avoids putting forth a theory in which the intellect is blocked from 
direct access to sensory experience. Nonetheless, he does block 
the intellect from direct access to the external object. While this 
may seem odd, it is consistent with his claim that in this life our 
intellectual cognition is dependent on sensory cognition. 
Wolter has plausibly suggested that in fact Scotus's primary 
concern in the discussion of memory is to explain how we can 
extract a great deal of information out of a sense perceptible 
whole.26 Memory plays the key role, since only if we can remem 
ber our sense experiences, can we think about different aspects 
of those experiences. The consequence, though, of such an em 
phasis is that the intellect reasons primarily about the universal 
content that can be abstracted from sense perception. It is only 
when we want to think about the existence of an object that we 
turn to a species in the intellectual memory impressed by the 
intellect's awareness of a past sensory experience of a then 
present and existing object. Nonetheless, he must have seen that 
what he was suggesting in his discussion of memory showed 
that intuitive cognition had wider scope than the issue of gath 
ering information about an object previously known. The 
Ordinatio text shows Scotus aware of the expanded scope of 
intuitive cognition by stressing that it also grounds our contin 
gent statements about the world and yet it does so without the 
intellect having any direct access to the external object. While 
it should be abundantly clear that we cannot know the singu 
lar as singular via intuitive cognition, nonetheless we can know 
that the singular exists and that we can predicate qualities of 
that singular via intuitive cognition. 
Several points remain unclear. The most pressing is an expla 
nation of the process by which sensory experience acts on the 
intellective memory. In addition, when Scotus states that the 
intellect produces a species, there is present an ambiguity inso 
far as he does not specify whether this production is the work of 
the agent or the potential intellect. These two questions take us 
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into the tricky area of Scotus's thought on the nature of the 
soul. After all, sensory experience takes place in the sense pow 
ers and they have much more in common with the body than 
they do with the intellect. By contrast, the intellect is immate 
rial. Scotus is quite clear in claiming that the subject that 
receives sensation is the sense organ and explicitly adds that 
sensation is not received in the soul itself. In fact, it is the or 
gan, understood as a composite of the soul and some particular 
part of the body that is the subject of sensation. This under 
standing of the relation of sense power and soul allows Scotus 
the room to hold that the intellect can be aware of the activity 
of sense powers insofar as the one soul is also a component part 
of the sense powers.27 This interpretation has the added bonus 
of cohering with his view of the relation of phantasm and agent 
intellect. Scotus holds that the agent intellect has no real ac 
tion (actio) on the phantasm because the phantasm exists in 
the imagination and were the intellect to act on the phantasms 
it too would have to be extended (extensum). The phantasm, for 
its part, does not act on the agent intellect because that would 
imply some passivity on the part of the agent intellect and would 
mean that it receives something. If the agent intellect were re 
ceptive, though, there would be no need for the potential intellect. 
We saw above that the agent intellect and phantasm work together 
as ordered causes to produce the intelligible species. However, 
Scotus has no doubt that the agent intellect does the bulk of the 
work in this relation, with the phantasm concurring only "materi 
ally" (materialiter) or "virtually" (virtualiter), but not really.28 
So, just as the agent intellect is not acted on by the phantasm, 
so too the intellect is not acted on by the individual sensory 
experiences. The very notion of intuitive cognition bespeaks a 
kind of immediacy that would be lacking if the sensory experi 
ences were causative of the intellect's production of a species. 
These considerations are sufficient to allow us to answer the 
second question as well. The species deposited in intellectual 
memory must be a product of the agent intellect in much the 
same way that the agent intellect produces an intelligible spe 
cies based on the phantasm. The species resulting from intuitive 
cognition would be received in the potential intellect, which here 
must be read as identical to intellectual memory. 
To sum up, when I see my cat, my senses operate in their 
usual fashion and the separate information of the senses is col 
lated in an internal sense power. At this point two possibilities 
are present: I can use the phantasm to think about the nature of 
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cats or I can think about my cat. How do I do the latter? Again, 
there are two possibilities. I can create an increasingly exhaus 
tive list of qualities possessed by my cat that in practice, if not 
in principle, will allow me to distinguish my cat from other cats I 
may encounter. Or I can think about my cat as present and ac 
tual before me. How do I do these two latter acts of thought? 
Both require recourse to the intellective memory and its species 
previously impressed by the act of intellectual intuitive cogni 
tion. How does the species differ from the phantasm in the inner 
sense power? Other than its metaphysical status (the phantasm 
in the inner sense will be in some manner material while that in 
the intellective memory will be immaterial) the species in memory 
is not abstractive. Recall that the phantasm in the imagination 
is in some sense "disconnected" from actual instances of percep 
tion. That is why I can imagine a gold mountain even though I 
have never seen one. By contrast, the species in the intellective 
memory has a direct connection to an act of sensation. The point 
is as follows: If I say "That's my cat," I can make the assertion 
only because I know that the object in front of me is my cat and 
that can happen only because I have sensed my cat and the in 
tuitive awareness of my sensory act has left its species in my 
intellective memory. Now, when I think about my cat, there is 
both a universal content ("cat") and a singular content expressed 
by the indexical pronoun ("my"). The universal content alone can 
not be responsible for my knowledge of my cat as mine, so it must 
be the indexical content that is responsible and that latter con 
tent is dependent on the species resulting from my intuitive 
intellectual cognition of my sensory experience of my cat. Accord 
ingly, I am suggesting that the species in my intellect that results 
from my sensory experience is responsible for the content that 
differentiates my experience from a qualitatively similar experi 
ence that someone else might have. It is not the thisness in the 
singular that indexes my cognition, because it is not known in this 
life by the senses or the intellect, but rather the fact that it is my 
cognition gives it the singular status necessary to allow for both 
existential judgements and the individuation of such judgments. 
Singular Propositions, Again 
Returning to the problem raised earlier about the nature of sin 
gular propositions, I now want to propose that for Scotus intuitive 
cognition, and the species it leaves in the intellective memory, 
functions like the third element in the triadic theory of belief 
put forward by Austin. In other words, intuitive cognitions are 
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analogous to what I earlier called the variable in the analysis of 
individual propositions. Using the two tubes example again, the 
patch seen by the left eye and the patch seen by the right eye 
would be known intuitively in different experiences because the 
awareness of the two patches would result in two different spe 
cies in the intellective memory. Schematically, then, we would 
have as representations of our sensory experiences: 
< = > + intuitive cognition/species1 
< = > + intuitive cognition/species2 
The virtue of distinguishing the two cognitions in this way is 
clear. There is no reason to think that anyone who believes both 
of these would be committed to the belief that the two are iden 
tical. We avoid, consequently, the unfortunate result of 
mistakenly identifying that which should be distinguished. The 
unique identifier provided by the species generated in the 
memory suffices to differentiate the two propositions otherwise 
identical in content. In addition, not only does Scotus's account 
of intuitive intellectual cognition provide a solution to the prob 
lem of the identity of a third term in beliefs about singular 
propositions, it also suggests that he is committed to a notion of 
"wide-content" in the case of knowledge of singulars. 
Consider a typical belief of the form "I believe x" where x 
stands for some proposition relating two terms. Such beliefs can 
be about propositions relating sortal terms, that is, universals 
or kinds ("Cats are animals") or they can be of singulars ("Trixie 
is a cat").29 In the case of beliefs about singulars, the content 
will be wide just in case we cannot make sense of the item in 
question in terms of the content of only our minds. Thus, if some 
one believes that Trixie is a cat, on Scotus's account that can 
only be so because of some prior intuitive cognition of a sensory 
experience of Trixie. It is a quick step to conclude that we can 
not have an intuitive cognition of Trixie without committing 
ourselves to asserting Trixie's existence. Consequently, then, our 
intuitive cognition in the intellect is dependent on the existence 
of the originating object in such a way that the intellect itself is 
not sufficient to explain the cognition. Such an implication can 
be drawn, I believe, from Scotus's discussion and it follows that, 
to borrow Putnam's striking phrase, he is committed to the thesis 
that the meanings we attribute to singulars are not just in the 
head.30 That would not be the case, obviously, with our abstractive 
knowledge of Trixie since abstractive knowledge carries no exis 
tential commitment along with it. 
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Conclusion 
I want to conclude with a bit of speculation about what may be 
standing behind Scotus's account of intuitive cognition. His pri 
mary worry, it seems to me, arises from the distinction between 
sensation on the one hand and intellectual cognition on the other. 
Once this distinction is made, a thinker must be very careful. 
Since the internal sense powers can be creative, that is, abstrac 
tive, we can have phantasms of both cats and gold mountains. If a 
theory of knowledge of the singular relies on some sort of intel 
lectual reflection on the phantasm, we run into the problem of 
being unable, in principle at least, to discriminate between actu 
ally existing realities and merely imaginary ones. By appealing 
to an intellectual awareness of our acts of sensation, Scotus neatly 
displaces the problematic of the knowledge of the singular. In 
stead of having to rely on potentially misleading phantasms, we 
have a properly intellectual mechanism for making judgments 
about singulars. It is worth thinking about one rather significant 
lacuna in his teaching on intuitive cognition of the singular. 
Scotus fails to provide us with a description of the species pro 
duced by intuitive cognition. We saw before that there is a 
structural analogy between the agent intellect and phantasm on 
one side and intuitive cognition and prior sensory awareness on 
the other side. Now, the agent intellect produces an intelligible 
species based on the phantasm and that species represents uni 
versally the nature present in the item the phantasm represents. 
So, the intelligible species represents "cat," while the phantasm 
represents "Trixie," although the phantasmic representation car 
ries no information about existence. While we now know that the 
species produced by the intellect via intuitive cognition carries 
information about existence, we are not told by Scotus what that 
species represents, or how it represents. I do not see how that 
species can function in the same way as the intelligible species 
derived from the phantasm, and that leads me to conclude that 
the species produced by intuitive cognition must represent a sin 
gular sensory experience. If so, we have here in a nascent form 
the positing of a type of species in the intellect that is represen 
tative of a singular, not a universal.31 
Marquette University 
144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY 
NOTES 
1. Ordinatio, IV, D. 45, q. 3, tr. M. Adams and A. Wolter in "Memory 
and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychol 
ogy: Introduction, Edition, and Translation of Scotus' Ordinatio IV, d.45, 
q.3," Franciscan Studies 53 (1993-97), pp. 175-230. All references to other 
questions in the Ordinatio are based on the critical edition that is still in 
progress: Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, edited under the direction of 
C. Balic (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanus, 1950-present). 
2. See, for example, Aristotle, De anima, II, 5 (417b21-26); Posterior 
Analytics, I, 31 (87b37-39); Physics, I, 5 (189a2-8). For a good discussion of 
the issues surrounding knowledge of singulars and universals, see Joseph 
Owens, "The Universality of the Sensible in the Aristotelian Noetic," 
M?langes a la m?moire de Charles De Koninck (Les Presses de l'Universit? 
Laval, 1968), pp. 167-168, reprinted in Aristotle: The Collected Papers of 
Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Caton (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1981), pp. 59-73. 
3. It must be noted that Scotus uses "proposition" in a different sense 
than contemporary philosophers. The latter use "proposition" to refer to 
that which is expressed by a declarative sentence while Scotus uses "propo 
sition" as equivalent to a declarative sentence. Still, Scotus clearly 
privileges mental activity to spoken or written words and this warrants 
me to at least wonder if a problem about the "meaning" of propositions 
can be found in exploring the contents of thought and how they refer to 
objects. 
4. Stephen Dumont ("Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Dis 
tinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," Speculum 64 
[1989], pp. 579-99) has argued convincingly that Scotus's primary con 
cern in the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition 
concerns the question of the notion of the scientific status of theology. 
Allan Wolter ("Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory and Our Knowledge of 
Individuals," in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. M. 
Adams [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990], p. 100) has stated 
that intuitive cognition should not be confused with existential judge 
ments. Indeed that's true, but I hope to show that they do provide warrant 
for such judgments. 
5. The literature on the topic of proper names, indexicals and 
demonstratives is vast. I have found the following resources most useful: 
Gregory McCulloch, The Game of the Name (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Howard Wettstein, Has Semantics Rested on Mistake? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); John Perry, The Essential 
Indexical and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). My 
understanding of the issues surrounding proper names and the "Fregean" 
view was shaped by Wettstein's discussion. 
SCOTUS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINGULAR 145 
6. John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous 13 
(1979), p. 3 as cited in David F. Austin, What's the Meaning of "This"?: A 
Puzzle about Demonstrative Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990), p. 12. 
7. Austin, pp. 20-24. 
8. Austin, pp. 112-115. 
9. The literature on Scotus and individuation is large. My brief ac 
count here follows E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: Introduction a ses positions 
fondamentales (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 444-477; A. Wolter, "John Duns 
Scotus," in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and 
the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, J. Gracia, ed. (Albany: State Uni 
versity of New York Press, 1994), pp. 271-98. The central text in Scotus 
concerning individuation is Ordinatio II, 3, 1. 
10. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, 15, 4 (vol. II: 257), tr. G. Etzkorn 
and A. Wolter, (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Press, 1997) 
2 vols. The translation is based on the critical text found in Quaestiones 
super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis, eds., R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. 
Gal, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marcil, T. Noone, R. Wood (St. Bonaventure, 
N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Press, 1997), 2 vols. 
11. Opus Oxoniensis, III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 9 (p. 306). The text can be found 
in Opera Omnia, ed. L. Wadding. Lyons, 1639 (Reprinted Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 1968). 
12. Ordinatio. I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3 (p. 113). 
13. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, 15, 36 (vol. II: 264). 
14. Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1 (pp. 209-210). 
15. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, 15, 4 (vol. II: 258). 
16. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, 13, 26 (vol. II: 241). This claim 
is stated as an objection to a view Scotus is putting forth. However, he 
does not take issue with the claim in his response to the objection; indeed 
he seems to presuppose that it is correct. 
17. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, q. 15, n. 20 (vol. II: 259). 
18. Ordinatio. d. 3, pars 1, q. 3 (pp. 87-88). 
19. Questions on the Metaphysics, VII, q. 15, n. 8 (vol. II: 262-63). 
20. For an overview of Scotus's teaching on intelligible species, see 
Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 257-66. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2. For further discussion of the way in 
which the phantasm and agent intellect produce the intelligible species, 
see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 529-32; I. Manzano, "El processo 
cognoscitivo en J. D. Escoto," Verda y Vida 32 (1974), pp. 325-36. 
146 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY 
23. Quodlibetal Questions, XIII, 8 in John Duns Scotus, God and Crea 
tures: The Quodlibetal Questions, tr. F. Alluntis and A. Wolter (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 309. For the Latin, see Cuestiones 
Cuodlibetales (Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto), ed. and tr. F. 
Alluntis (Madrid: Editorial Cat?lica, 1968). 
24. Readings of this type are provided by S. Day, Intuitive Cognition: 
A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1947), pp. 39-139; C. B?rub?, La connaissance 
de l'individuel au moyen ?ge (Montreal and Paris: Presses de l'Universit? 
de Montr?al and Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), pp. 199-202; 
K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age ofOckham, (Leden: E. J. Brill, 
1987), pp. 69-75. 
25. Ordinatio, IV, d. 45, 16-17. For a reading of Scotus along these 
lines, see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, pp. 512-23; Wolter, "Duns Scotus on 
Intuition," pp. 98-125, and Wolter and Adams, "Memory and Intuition," 
pp. 177-79. 
26. Wolter, "Duns Scotus on Intuition," pp. 118-19. 
27. Quodlibetal Questions, IX, pp. 26-40. Gilson (Jean Duns Scot, pp. 
490-510) provides a good discussion of Scotus's account of the soul. At 
Ordinatio IV, d. 49, q. 11, Scotus explicitly identifies sensory cognition 
with the composite of organ and power and states that sensation requires 
an organ for its functioning. 
28. Ordinatio, I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 1 (pp. 216-18). Gilson (Jean Duns Scot, 
p. 517) argues that the non-causal relationship between phantasm and 
agent intellect provides a foundation for the "autonomy" of the intellec 
tual order. 
29. For the sake of simplicity, I am only going to discuss the case of 
proper names in singular propositions, but I assume that a similar story 
could be told in the case of demonstrative adjectives and pronouns as well. 
30. My discussion of wide content is dependent on the clear account 
provided by Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and its World (London: 
Routledge, 1995), pp. 175-90. It is worth noting, although discussion of 
the point is outside the scope of this paper, that Gilson's (Jean Duns Scot, 
p. 550) comment that there is little practical difference between Thomas 
Aquinas and Scotus on the issue of knowledge of the singular may be 
misleading. In fact, on this point about content, they seem very far apart 
since Aquinas argues that our intellect knows existing singulars by its 
reflection back on the phantasm. Now the phantasm is abstractive, that 
is, it is indifferent to existence. Thus, while Thomas accepts that we can 
make existential judgments about singulars, it is unclear how that hap 
pens given that the phantasm is intrinsically divorced from the existing 
singular itself. In fact, it appears that he will always be subject to a kind 
of skeptical pressure: how could I know that this phantasm of a mountain 
(Mt. Ventoux, for example) differs from that phantasm of a mountain (a 
gold mountain) as regards causal origin? For a brief account of Thomas's 
SCOTUS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINGULAR 147 
view on knowledge of the singular, see my "Intellectual Knowledge of 
Material Particulars in Thomas Aquinas: An Introduction," in Aquinas 
on Mind and Intellect: New Essays, ed. Jeremiah Hackett (Oakdale, N.Y.: 
Dowling College Press, 1996), pp. 85-116. I hope to treat the issue of 
wide and narrow content in Aquinas's theory in the near future. 
31. An early version of this paper was read at the International Con 
gress of Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Michigan in 1999. I want to thank 
the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University for granting me 
a reduced course load in Spring 2000 that allowed me time to rework the 
paper. An anonymous reader for this journal offered several suggestions 
for improving it, which I gratefully accepted; the remaining faults are, of 
course, entirely my responsibility. 
